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Summary findings
Faced with weak subnational finances that pose a risk to  municipal clients; differentiate interest rates on the basis
macroeconomic stability, Mexico's federal government in  of the borrowers'  creditworthiness; and elicit a strong
April 2000 established an innovative incentive  demand for institutional development at the subnational
framework to bring fiscal discipline to state and  level.
municipal governments.  But its success will depend on three factors critical to
That framework is based on two pillars: an explicit  implementation:
renunciation  of federal bail-outs and a Basel-consistent  *  Whether  markets find the federal commitment not
link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to  to bail out defaulting subnational governments credible.
subnational governments and the borrower's  credit  *  Whether  subnational governments have access to
rating.  financing other than bank loans.
In theory, this new regulatory arrangement should  *  How well bank capital rules are enforced.
reduce moral hazard among banks and their state and
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Introduction
Much as defaults  on commercial  banks' liabilities  (in particular,  deposits) carry
systemic  costs that far out-weigh  private considerations,  the liabilities  of sub-national
governments  in federal systems  can also generate  large, negative  externalities  for the
country  as a whole. While those governments  have a constitutional  right to manage  their
own finances,  including  borrowing decisions,  the cost of their financial  performance  is
spread to other states, to the federal  government  and, sometimes,  even to other countries.
The experience  of the Brazilian  state of Minas Gerais  in January 1999 is a clear example  of
the wedge between a single  state's private cost of default and the economy-  and region-
wide social cost of that default.'  There is, in other words, a public  good case for
regulating  sub-national  borrowing.
While the externalities  involved  in commercial  banking  have led to a well-
developed  regulatory practice (and literature), relatively  less is known or commonly
accepted  about sub-national  borrowing regulation,  especially  in developing  countries. 2
This dearth of knowledge  is odd as, in those countries,  the bulk of the sub-national
borrowing is financed  by domestic  banks, leading  to an important second-order  externality
implicit  in state defaults. In principle,  a large state's reneging  from its bank debt
1 See for example, "Brazil's Government  Pays Foreign Debt Owed by One of Its States,"
The New York Times, February 11, 1999,  Thursday.
2.Taken  together,  Ter-Minassian  and Craig  (1997),  Freire  and  Huertas  (1999),  and  Dillinger  and Webb
(1999)  provide  a good  sampler  of development-country  oriented  literature  available  in this area.
2obligations  compromises  not only the market access of other states and, internationally,  of
the federal government,  but also the banks' ability  to service  their deposits.
Those first- and second-order  externalities  make federal bail-outs  of defaulting
states virtually  inevitable  (effectively  distributing  the cost of the state's default among  the
tax-payers of all the states in the federation). This, ex-ante, generates  moral hazard of two
types-it  fosters irresponsible  borrowing  by the states and  irresponsible  lending  by their
bankers. The danger of irresistible  pressure for federal bailouts,  and thus of both types of
moral hazard, is increased  when the borrowers are sub-national  governments  with service
provision  responsibilities  that are important  to the national  government,  such as primary
schooling  and police protection. This is typical  of developing  countries,  like Mexico,
where political  expediency  hastened expenditure  decentralization  without prior
establishment  of an adequate  regulatory framework  for state and municipal  borrowing.
This paper describes  and analyzes  Mexico's innovative  approach to regulating  sub-
national  bank borrowing. It starts by presenting  the context in which that approach  was
introduced in April 2000 as well as the regulatory  regime's main  policy components. A
theoretical  model is then developed  to examine  the economic  underpinnings  of the regime,
and is simulated  under various parametric structures. This helps identify  the main
conditions  for Mexico's sub-national  bank borrowing  regulation  to achieve  its core
objective,  namely,  to minimize  the cost of federal bail-outs  while  fostering efficiency-
enhancing,  risk-based  interest rate differentiation  across sub-national  borrowers. Three
such conditions  are shown to be critical:  (i) the market credibility  of the federal
commitment  not to bail-out defaulting  sub-nationals;  (ii) the sub-nationals'  access to
3financing  other than bank loans; and (iii) the quality  of the enforcement  of bank capital
rules.
Sub-national Borrowing in Mexico: The Initial Position
Sub-national  debt in Mexico  has so far not been a national  macroeconomic
problem  (as it has in Brazil for example),  but it could rapidly  become one. In 1997,  the
recorded stock of state and municipal  debt was equivalent  to about 2 percent of Mexico's
GDP (and about 6 percent of total public  debt). 3 By comparison,  sub-national  debt
amounts  to 5 percent of GDP in Argentina,  almost  20 percent in Canada,  and somewhat
above  that level in Brazil. In addition,  the Mexican  constitution  prohibits  states from
borrowing  in foreign  exchange  or from foreign  creditors.
Behind Mexico's relatively  comfortable  sub-national  debt statistics,  however, lie
three potential  destabilizing  factors-moral  hazard,  limited  actual servicing  capacity,  and
contingent  liabilities.  Prior to the 1990s  the federal government,  through the governing
party's infrastructure,  had control over the state governments,  and thus ultimately  over
any state borrowing decisions Over the course of the 1990s,  rapid democratization  ended
much of this federal political  control, which allowed  states to take advantage  of the federal
government's concern  for both the banking  system  (which, following  its 1995 crisis,  had
3.  Most  Mexican  states have  much less disposable  income  to service  debt  than  usual accounting  would
suggest,  since  much  of  their  current  expenditures  is  "tied"  to  defacto inflexible  commitments  (notably
salaries). The ratio of debt stock  to disposable  revenue,  the latter defined  as own taxes  plus untied
transfers,  ranges  from a maximum  of 1.8 (in Sonora)  to a minimum  of 0.02 (in Hidalgo). By that
measure,  the eight  most indebted  states  are Sonora,  Nuevo  Le6n, Mdxico,  Queretaro,  Quintana  Roo,
Baja California  Sur, Jalisco,  and Sinaloa,  all with  a ratio of debt  stock  to disposable  revenue  greater
than 1  (Hemandez  and Oliveira,  2000).
4problems  of its own) and for the ability  of states to continue delivering  important  public
services  which had been decentralized.
Indeed, both states and banks in Mexico had witnessed  many  federal bailouts  in the
past and had come to expect them, thus making  borrowing a means  through which states
could obtain extra federal resources transferred  to them directly  or through their creditors.
The federal  government's capacity  to deliver  those transfers  was embedded  in its annual
budget through a special and often large line-item  to be allocated at the Executive's
discretion  (especially  within  Ramo 23). All states received  bailouts  in the wake of the
1995 crisis, and a few states have  received  bailouts since  then when guarantees came due
on large infrastructure  projects.
Perhaps  more importantly,  the federal government's practice of accepting  state
mandatos  (mandates)  to act as a trustee in servicing  state debt that had been collateralized
withparticipaciones (revenue  sharing)  became  a defacto pre-condition  for states to have
access  to credit markets, not just because of the value of the collateral  but because of the
perceived  blessing  and guarantee  by the federal government. Legally,  a mandato became
a perfect "intercept" for the lenders,  whereby  the federation  would automatically  pay back
bank loans out of the  participaciones  that would otherwise  correspond  to the debtor state,
before the monies  could reach that state and, thus, without violating  its constitutional
jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly,  few commercial  banks developed  their institutional  capacity  to
assess sub-national  lending,  even  though they have  been active in this market. Structural
problems  in the financial  markets  that were exposed in the aftermath  of the 1995 banking
crisis (e.g., weak commercial  guarantee and bankruptcy  laws; limited  judicial  capacity)
5drove banks away from private borrowers and toward secured  lending  possibilities  with
federal and state government  entities. The existence  of a regimen de excepci6n,  whereby
usual regulatory limits  to single-customer  exposure (concentration  limits) did not apply  to
loans given  to sub-national  governments  made those possibilities  all the more attractive.
In sum, the combination  of sovereign  states ability  to make independent  borrowing
decisions  along with increasing  expenditure  responsibilities,  banks with a need for secured
lending  options, and a federal government  with a track record of acting as last-resort
lender put Mexico in an uncomfortable  position  with regard to sub-national  liabilities  and
their potential  impact on the country's macroeconomic  stability.
A New Approach  to Sub-national  Borrowing Regulation
To reverse the situation,  Mexico's federal government  faced the challenge  of both
imposing  ex-ante, market-based  mechanisms  that would prevent excessive  sub-national
borrowing and at the same time convey  a credible  signal  that it would not, ex-post, bail-
out the parties involved  in such  borrowing. In response  to this challenge,  it introduced  in
late 1999 (with full effect as of April 2000) a new regulatory  framework  for debt
management  by the states and municipalities.  This framework  is made  up of the following
six components:
1.  A renunciation,  and ensuing  removal from the federal  budget for 2000, of the
Executive's power for discretionary  transfer. Naturally,  this policy proved
uncontroversial  with the opposition-dominated  Congress.
2.  The abolition  of the mandatos. This left the states and their creditors  to make their
own  fideicomiso (trust) arrangements  for the collateralization  of debt with
6parficipaciones  or other revenue flows, assuming  the legal risks involved  and
without recourse  to the federation.
3.  The elirnination  of the so-called  regimen de excepci6n  to single-customer  exposure
ceilings. This limits the extent of financial-sector  damage  that one single  state can
cause and signals  that state debt must be evaluated  on a basis similar  with other debt.
4.  The establishment  of a link  between the capital risk weighting  of bank loans to sub-
national  governments  and those governments' credit rating. In particular,  two,
current, published,  global-scale  local-currency  credit ratings performed  by
internationally  reputable  credit rating agencies are to be used by bank regulators  to
assign capital  risk weightings  (between 20 and 115 percent) to loans given to state
and municipalities.  The rules for assigning  these weights are fully specified  by
regulation.
This innovative  scheme,  which is in line  with the Basle  Committee's
recommendations  of June 1999,  is based on the distance  between the rating obtained
by the sub-national  borrower in question and the rating  of the local-currency  debt of
the federal government. To control for agency shopping,  two ratings  are called  for
by the regulation  and, in case of large discrepancies  (more than two grades of
distance), the capital  weighting  of the worse rating applies.
The purpose of these regulations  is, of course, to make  the pricing of bank loans a
function of the underlying  risk of the sub-national  borrower, especially  in the new
framework  characterized  by the absence  of federal intervention. Financially  weaker
states are likely  to be priced or rationed out of the market (and become conditional
7clients of the development  banks-see  below), while stronger states would see the
price of loans fall.
5.  Registration of sub-national  loans with the federal government  was made conditional
upon the borrowing state or municipality  being current on its publication  of debt and
associated fiscal statistics from the preceding  year's final accounts, and on all of its
debt service obligations  toward the Government's development  banks. At the same
time, and to make that registration  appealing,  unregistered  loans are automatically
risk weighted  by the regulators at 150 percent. This additional  incentive  to achieve
transparency  has the purpose of ensuring  that private contracting  between the sub-
national  borrowing and the credit rating agencies  does not lead to the withholding  of
a minimum  of quantitative  information  on borrower finances. Ultimately,  the
discipline  on these governments  will arise only if voters and opposition  parties have
access  to full information  about the fiscal behavior of the administration  in office.
6.  Finally, and as a matter of corporate policy,  federally-owned  development  banks are
to make new loans to states and municipalities  only when the loan in question
qualifies  for registration and its corresponding  capital  risk weighting  is less than 100
percent. This policy, coupled with the previously  mentioned  conditions  for
registration, makes  the development  banks part of the rigor of the new regulatory
scheme,  rather than allowing  them to function as a potential  loophole.
Lending to weaker sub-nationals  is not forbidden,  after all, these are the clients
whom the development  banks are mandated to assist. Instead, sub-national  loans
with risk weightings of more than 100 percent are allowed  if the loan package
8contains a technical  assistance  component  funded by an international  development
bank. This latter arrangement  conveys  the signal  that, when the loan is particularly
risky (and correspondingly  expensive),  its origination  and supervision  is subject to a
neutral, independent  party.
The Theory Behind the Rules
How does Mexico's regulatory environment  for sub-national  bank borrowing
work, that is, provide incentive  for interest rates to reflect  the creditworthiness  of the
borrowers and reduce the expected  cost of federal bail-outs? This section addresses that
question by developing  and simulating  a simple,  one-period  model of interest rate
determination  in the sub-national  loan market. Rational,  profit-maximizing  banks
operating in competition  will  be shown to generate interest and bail-out cost outcomes
that critically  depend  on the perceived  (not necessarily  the declared) attitude of the
federation  toward bail-outs; the existence  of alternate means of financing  for sub-national
governrnents;  and the quality of banking  supervision. This sets up the stage for simulating
the effect of Mexico's new regulations  under various parametric structures.
The model will assume that, at the beginning  of the period, the representative  bank
ignores what the repayment  capacity  or asset value,  A, of the sub-national  borrower will
be at the end of the period, when the loan must be repaid. It knows, however, that there
are two possible outcomes for A:  a high value, AH, and a low value,  AL, which is some
proportion,  p, of the high value, so that AL  =  p  AH,  where 0 <  p < 1. For simplification,
and with no loss of generality,  AH is here normalized  so that AH1  and AL=p. Thus,
A = {AL,  A, 3 = {p, 1}. The probability  of a low outcome, o-  e [0,1], is also known to the
9bank. In practice,  A can be thought of as the ex-post capacity  of a borrowing  state or
municipality  to repay  its debts, a variable  usually associated  with, among others, local
business  cycles  and fiscal  efforts.
Three other factors will play a critical  role in the bank's sub-national  lending
decision: a) the portion of the loan's service  that the federal  government  is expected  to
bail out,  m E [0,1]; b) the capital risk weighting,  w E [0,+oo), required by the regulations
for bank loans to states and municipalities;  and c) the quality  of banking  supervision,
denoted here by q E [0,1],  i.e., the resulting  effectiveness  with which capital  risk weighting
regulations  are enforced. The three factors are at the core of Mexico's new regulatory
system  for sub-national  borrowing. By renouncing  its powers to execute discretionary
transfers in its budget for the year 2000 (and, supposedly,  thereafter),  the federal
government  vastly reduced, if not eliminated,  the perception  that it would bail-out sub-
nationals  that default  on their debt. By linking  capital risk weights to credit ratings,  the
value of w varies  across states and municipalities,  rather than being  uniform  for all loans to
sub-national  governrments.  Finally,  through a package of reforms put in motion in
September 1999,  rules for bank capital  formation and accounting  were brought up to
internationally  accepted standards and are gradually  being  enforced 4.
Given  these framework  conditions,  a form for the supply  of bank loans to sub-
national  governments, L',  can be developed. Equation (1) and (2) below, define  the
expected  revenue  and expected  cost of the representative  bank in the one-period sub-
national  loan market:
4For  a description of the September  1999 banking reforms,  see the website  of La Comisi6n  Nacional
Bancariay de Valores http://www.cnbv.gob.mx/index.htm.
10E[R]=(1-o-).P  i,+ o-m-L'S  i  (1)
E[C]=Ls  id +q.w.p.L'+a-c(l-m)-(Ji  -AL)  (2)
where i,,  id, and pE(-oo,+oo)  are the loan interest rate, the deposit interest rate and the
return on the bank's equity (or opportunity  cost of capital),  respectively.
Equation (1) states that the expected revenue  of the bank is not only a function of
the risk of default by the sub-national  borrower, but also of the portion,  m, of the loan  that
the federal government  is expected  to bailout if default takes place. As m approaches 1,
the moral hazard inherent in the market increases,  and thus it is more likely  that the lenders
will  receive  their due revenue in full, or simply  E[R] = il . Similarly,  Equation (2) argues
that the expected  cost of the loan depends on the cost of funds, the cost of fulfilling  capital
risk weighting  regulations  (given  the quality  of enforcement) 5 and, in the event of default,
the portion of the unpaid  balance (that is, the loan's principal  minus the low asset value,
AL) not bailed out by the federal government. 6 If there is close  to perfect moral hazard,
m-)l,  and no capital risk weighting  requirements  exist,  w  -O,  or the quality of their
enforcement  is poor, q->O,  the expected per unit cost of the loan approaches  the deposit
interest rate, E[C]  - 'd.
Assuming  that the market for loans is competitive,  i.e., equilibrium  is characterized
by no supra-nornal profits and E[JR]  = E[Cj, the following  implicit  function  for the supply
of loans obtains  from equations  (1) and (2):
5 We  adapt  the  middle  tenn  of  Equation  (2)  from  LUvy-Garboua  (1993).
6Note  that  E[ A] = a - AL  + (1 - a-)  AH . However,  since  the bank  would  never  lend  more  thanAH
(net of interest), it will, in the event of a high outcome,  recover its principal and make its return on the
loan,  L  i l, in full.  Thus only  AL factors into the expected  cost function.
11i=  id +qwp+  lC.(1-m){(I  +  _  )  (3)
In addition to the cost of funds and the cost of fulfilling  the regulatory
requirements,  the supply price of a one-dollar loan is implicitly  determined  by the portion
of the loan's gross revenue that the bank does not expect to recover per dollar lent.
Equation (3) can be rearranged into the following:
il  = 1  * id  +  wp(  +  l(l  -m)I-  AL  (4)
where  a  = 1  - a(1 - m)  >0. It can then  be shown  that:  <0  ,  0  , - <  0,  all
0  ac  'aAL
reasonable characteristics  of a supply  function  for sub-national  loans. States and
municipalities  will pay less for their loans the higher  the chances  that the federation  will
bail them out, the lower the probability  of bad asset outcome, and the higher  their asset
value when a bad outcome materializes.  7
To complete the model, the demand  for sub-national  loans is assumed as a simple
linear function of the interest rate:
LD = a -,Bi  (5)
The additional  restriction, a  = AH, is added to the model as a sub-national  government
can borrow no more than the high value of its asset.'
'Note  that the usual marginal cost equal marginal revenue condition for profit maximization  yields the
following solutionfortheinterestrate,  i,  =  I  + qwp  + o-(l _ m)Iwhlchisthesameastotal
revenue equal total cost approach solution above as L'.
8 Another way to rationalize that restriction is as follows. Sub-national goveniments are not able to
borrow more than the expected  value of their asset. At the same time, for interest rates to be zero, a
necessary  condition is that risk be zero. In that case, E[A] = a  -AL  + (1 - a)  .AH , and since  AH=1,
then a = E[A] = 1, when a--o.
12Equating supply (4) and demand (5), and after some rearrangement,  the following
quadratic  function  for the equilibrium  interest rate is:
i2,#6-i,(6a  +± 0) +a0-r=O  (6)
where y =  a(1-  m) AL and 0 = id + q op  P + cr (I  m) .9 The solution  for (6) yields  two
distinct real roots'0 . The analysis here is confined to the root which yields positive interest
rates and loan quantities. This root and, thus, the equilibrium  interest rate solution  is
given by:
il = g3-  (ax + 60 - [4Pi(.r-  a) +  (-a  - I5f)P)  (7)
Simulating the Effect of the New Rules
This section employs  Equation (7) to simulate  the effect of changes  in demand  and
policy parameters  on the equilibrium  interest rate, quantity of loans, and expected  cost of
bail-outs by (and to) the federal government. This expected cost is determined  by:
E[C] = M (L (1 + ij) -AL).  C-  (8)
9  The  existence  of an interior  solution  in quadrant  I, and hence,  an equilibrium  for  the supply  and
demand  for  funds  requires  that a  > r . This  is found  by  noting  that lim LS = r,  which  is the
0  il  >Oo  0
horizontal  intercept  of  the  supply  function,  must  be  less  than c.  This  condition  is necessary  and sufficient
for  an equilibrium  with  positive  i and  L, and  implies  that  the  interest  rate  never  exceeds  the  positive
asymptote,-.
1 The condition  for the existence  of  two  distinct  real  roots  is op  = [(5a  + fi0)] 2 + 4,/B{v - a  °)>  0
13That is, the federal  government  expects to pay a portion, m, of the difference  between the
loan repayment  amount and the state's low-value  asset, with probability  o-. If the high
asset value  materializes,  no federal outlay is required.
Alternative  regulatory  regimes enter the expected  bail-out cost via their effect on
interest rates, yet, changes  in interest rates have an ambiguous  effect on the expected  cost,
which is shown  to depend on the elasticity  of the demand  for loans."  For example,  higher
capital  risk weighting  requirements,  assuming  q>O  and p>O,  will  increase equilibrium
interest rates, and for a demand  curve with non-zero  elasticity,  reduce the loan quantities.
The combined  effect, in terms of expected  bail-out, hinges on the parametric  values of the
capital  risk weighting  variable,  w, the elasticity  of the demand  for loans, - , and
a -,B
the moral hazard proxy, m.
Four basic policy scenarios  are simulated  here: (i) banking  regulations  which
require no capital risk weighting  of sub-national  loans, so that w = 0 (an arrangement  not
uncommon  in countries  where the federation  is perceived  as the guarantor of state and
municipal  borrowing and, thus, sub-national  loans are considered  riskless); (ii) a uniform,
but low capital risk weighting  scheme  for all sub-national  loans independent  of their risk;
"  The  ambiguous  interest  rate  effect  on  expected  cost  can  be seen  by  differentiating  (9)  with  respect  to  the
rate  of  interest:
WE[C]  = af m [a - 6(2i,  +  1)]  (9') oil
If P31,  the  impact  of  higher  interest  rates  on  the  expected  cost  of  federal  bail-outs  is unambiguously
negative.  If ,B<1,  the sign  of (9) becomes  ambiguous.  Letting  C(iQJ)  denote  a set of interest  rate  and P
pairs,  for 0<1,  then  plainly,  there  are an infinite  number  of C(i,,)  which  could  either  make  (9') negative
or positive.  The sign on (9) is determined  by whether  il dominates  a given  value  of l3  thus making  the
expected  marginal  cost  of interest  changes  negative.  On the other  hand,  a 0<1  may  dominate  any  value  of
i,, so  that [a -,6(2  i, + 1)]  > 0, leaving  (9')  positive  and  increasing  the expected  cost  of the government
when  interest  rates  rise.
14(iii) a similarly  uniform  but high capital risk weighting  scenario  called  for by regulation;
and (iv) regulation  which makes  capital risk weightings  a function of the underlying  risk as
measured,  for example,  by independent  credit rating agencies (this is the essence  of
Mexico's new regulatory system).  12 For each regulatory scenario  (that is, for each value of
w), three different  levels of moral hazard are simulated  (m=l, m=O.S  and m=O.  05), each
reflecting  a different  perceived  federal  attitude toward bail-outs.  3 Finally,  two varying
degrees  of demand  elasticity  are employed  (embedded  in the value of  j3), implying  either a
relatively  inelastic  or a relatively  elastic  demand  for sub-national  loans. Table 1 shows  the
exact values  (or, when relevant,  functional  form) given  to w, m, ,8 and the other
parameters  in the simulations.
Figures 1 through 6 illustrate  how the various combinations  of parametric
structures  interplay  to determine  changes  in interest rate and expected  bail-out cost as the
underlying  borrower risk, a-,  varies. The figures express expected  bail-out cost as a
proportion of the loan's principal-plus-interest,  measured in basis point units over the
corresponding  cost when zero capital  risk weighting  is required' 4. In other words, the
figures show the basis  point differential cost of any given  regulatory regime over an
arrangement  in which sub-national  bank borrowing  is, for regulatory purposes,
automatically  considered  risk-free. Thus, when a differential  cost series slopes upward,
2 For  the  simulations  in scenario  (iv),  the  Basel  Committee's  recommendations  for  the  level  of capital
risk  weighting  according  to risk  of  default  are  employed.  For  a detailed  description  of  the  weightings,  see
the  Basel  Committee's  Report,  A New CapitalAdequacy Framework-,  p. 29-32.
13 m=0.05,  rather  than  m=  0, is use  here  as a proxy  for  a no-bail-outs  situation,  since  the  case  of  m=O  is
trivial  in that,  there  are  by  definition  zero  expected  costs  to the  federal  government.
C 4 cost  as a  percent  of  the loan  and interest  is given  by: c  a  m[l  - eL(  i,)1
15Table 1
Parameter Values for Simulations
Parameter  Value
AL, low  asset  value  0.5
id, cost of funds  0.05
q, quality  of supervision  0.9
w,  capital  risk weight
None  0.0
Uniformly  Low  0.08x0.2
Uniformly  High  0.08x  1.15
Function  of Risk  0.08x (0.2+cr)
p, bank's return  on equity  0.1
m, moral  hazard
High  (perfect)  1.0
Intermediate  0.5
Low  0.05
,B,  elasticity  parameter
Inelastic  0.5
Elastic  5.0
c-, risk  (0,1)
this is to be interpreted as a regime  which, for a given  level of risk, is more costly  to the
federal government  than no risk weighting requirements. Similarly,  interest rates are
shown as the basis point difference  between the interest rate prevailing  in a given
regulatory regime over the interest rate that applies  under zero capital risk weighting.  15
i) Inelastic Demand
As shown in Figure 1-a and l-b, a relatively  inelastic  demand  for loans and high
moral hazard are the worst possible combination  from the point of view of federal
government. In that scenario,  introducing regulations  that seek to penalize
uncreditworthy (risky) sub-national  borrowers is, in effect, self-defeating. This is because
the increase in interest rates caused by a tighter link between capital risk weighting  and
underlying  risk does not generate a large enough contraction in the equilibrium  quantity of
16loans. Although stricter regulation  makes credit more expensive,  states and municipalities
do not reduce the quantity demanded of loans sufficiently  and the moral-hazard-prone
federal government faces a large expected bail-out bill. The riskier  the sub-national  in
question, the larger that expected cost.
Why does credit become more expensive  in the first place? The reason is that the
introduction of capital risk weighting  requirement  increases  the cost of lending  to the
banks and, in competitive  markets, they pass the higher per unit cost to their borrowers.
Notice that, when compared to the non-weighted  scenario, the increase in interest rates
occurs even though there is 'perfect' moral hazard (that is, m = 1) and the federal
government is expected to bail out in full. However, risk-based  interest rate differentiation
only occurs when the regulatory link between capital risk weighting and risk assessments
(that is, credit ratings) is enforced.
As moral hazard shrinks  (that is, the value of m falls),  the differential  cost of
introducing positive capital risk weighting decreases across possible  regulatory regimes
(Figures  2a and 2b). Now that the federal government is less willing  to pick up the
expected cost of defaults, banks do not expect a full bail-out and subsequently  increase
interest rates more steeply in line with risk. But, given the inelastic  demand for funds by
states and municipalities  this increase in interest rates results in a relatively  smali
contraction in the quantity demanded for funds.  Partial federal willingness  to bail out (m
< 1) also achieves another important result -banks begin to differentiate  interest rates
across borrowers even in the case when capital risk weighting coefficients  are constant.
15Notethat:  ilw < ilw, since qnw  =id  +cr(1-m)<Ofw  =d  + qwp+a(1  m);wherethe
subscripts,  nw, and  w, respectively  denote,  non-weighted and  weighted.
17Finally,  when lenders are left to shoulder  the burden of any default (a situation
simulated  by m = 0.05), both interest rate differentiation  takes place across all regulatory
regimes  and, naturally,  expected  bail-out costs are minimized. Banks now fully  price-in
the risk embedded  in their sub-national  loans, either because of the possibility  of deeper
capital  losses from defaults,  or because the regulation  imposes  a link  between risk and
capital  risk weighting,  or both.  At high levels of risk, heftier loan prices  reduce loan size
by so much  relative to the asset value of the borrower in default (AL)  that the resulting
decline  in the bank's exposure tempers, and eventually  reverses the rise in interest rates
differentials  compared  with the regime  where no capital  risk weighting  requirements  exist.
Graphically,  interest rate differentials  peak before  risk (see Figure 3-a). Correspondingly,
the expected  bail-out cost is also hump-shaped,  and as risk approaches one (that is, default
becomes almost certain),  the cost becomes lower when non-zero capital  risk weighting
exists (the curves in Figure 3-b become negative). This outcome is noteworthy; at high
levels of risk, adequate  regulation and credible  renunciation  of bail-outs can reduce the
relative, ex-ante cost to the federal government  of sub-national  defaults,  even if the
demand for loans by states and municipalities  is inelastic.
It should additionally  be noted that, for each level of moral hazard, the quality of
regulatory enforcement,  q, acts as a filter to the impact  that the choice of capital risk
weighting  regime has on interest rates and expected  bail-out costs. Mathematically,  a
functional  form for q can be found that renders various regimes  equivalent. For example,
poor perceived  regulatory enforcement  (q < 1) can make the high-but-uniform  capital  risk
weighting  equivalent  to a low-but-uniform  regime,  from the bank's decision  point of view
(q = w,7,  lwhjg.  As q approaches 0, the interest rates on loans for a given level of m sh
18down across all levels of risk and converge  to the no capital  risk weighting  scenario. In
line with interest rates, expected  bail-out costs also converge  to the no capital risk
weighting  scenario  as q declines. Additionally,  and seemingly  somewhat  counterintuitive,
when the demand  for loans is inelastic,  better regulatory enforcement  (which in practice is
a federal responsibility)  raises the expected  bail-out costs to the federal government,  as the
proportional  increase in interest rates is larger than the reduction in loan  quantities. This
perverse  partial-equilibrium  result, of course, ignores the economy-wide  benefits  of risk-
based interest rate differentiation.
ii) Elastic Demand
Enforcing  capital risk weighting  of sub-national  loans through regulation  yields
better results, in terms of reducing  the expected cost of federal bail-outs,  when the
demand  for those loans is elastic. These simulations  are depicted  in Figures 4 through 6,
where,8  = 5 (rather than,1 = 0.5).
The change in the interest rate sensitivity  parameter  (1) has no effect  upon the
behavior  of interest rates when the federal government  is expected  to bail out in full, m = 1
(compared  Figure 1-a to 4-a). Yet, the increase  in interest rates caused  by the
introduction of capital  risk weighting  requirements  now leads to a more  than proportional
contraction  in the demand  for loans, thus reducing  the expected cost of bail-outs
compared  to the situation  in which capital  risk weighting  is zero. The cost reduction is
more pronounced,  the higher  the level of underlying  risk. Graphically,  the three curves in
Figure 4-b slope downward  throughout a negative  range of values.
An enhanced  demand  elasticity  does change  the pattern of differential  interest rates
when full bail-outs  are not expected,  m < I (compare  Figures 5-a and 6-a to 2-a and 3-a,
19respectively). In this case, the enforcement  of positive  capital risk weighting  regulations
raises interest rates but, as risk increases,  the more  than proportional reduction in loan
demand  reduces  the bank's exposure  vis-a-vis the low asset value, AL. This makes the
interest rate differential  in favor of the no capital  risk weighting  scenario  fall continuously
as risk expands. The downward sloping  functions  in differential  interest rates reinforces
the expected  saving in bail-out costs that accrues  to the federal government  as a result of
introducing  compulsory  capital  risk weighting  requirements (Figures 5-b and 6-b).
Improvements  in regulatory  enforcement  play a more constructive  role when the
demand  for sub-national  loans is relatively  elastic, compared  to the inelastic  case discussed
previously. As q increases, pushing  up interest rates and reducing  loan quantities  more
than proportionally,  the expected  cost of federal bail-outs diminishes. While  q still acts as
a filter that can  weaken the effect of various credit weighting  regimes,  the federal
authorities  now have a partial-equilibrium  incentive  to ensure that states and municipalities
abide  by the regulations
Condusions
In April 2000, Mexico's federal government  introduced a new approach to
regulate  sub-national  bank lending  in the country. That approach consists of two main
components:  the renunciation  by the federal authorities  of their discretionary  powers to
bail-out states and municipalities,  and the introduction  through regulation  of a link
between  capital risk weighting  of sub-national  bank loans and the underlying  risk of the
borrower (as assessed  by credit rating agencies).
20This paper describes  the new regulatory regime and constructs a model to explain
its theoretical  underpinnings,  and then simulates  that model under various parametric
structures. Highlighted  here, is the critical  role that the perceived commitment of the
federal government  to not bail-out defaulting  states and municipalities  plays in the success
of the new regime. When the elasticity of the demand for sub-national  loans is low, the
new regime is likely  to be counterproductive  in terms of expected federal bail-out costs if
not accompanied  by a credible  commitment  to refrain from bail-outs. If instead, demand
elasticity  is high, introducing a link  between capital risk weighting  and actual risk is always
beneficial  in that it reduces the expected cost of federal bail-outs vis-a-vis a no capital risk
weighting  scenario.
More generally,  for whatever degree of demand elasticity,  and even in the case
where the federal government is expected to bail out in full, a regulatory link between
capital risk weighting  and borrower creditworthiness  translates into efficiency-enhancing
interest rate differentiation  across sub-national  borrower given at least a minimum  of
competence  in enforcing  those regulations.
Although the model developed in this paper is, by design, static and does not
accommodate  reputational considerations,  it helps highlight  the importance of sound
creditworthiness  assessments  in the determination  of risk-based capital risk weightings.
The theory behind  the simulations  employs  a linear link between risk and capital risk
weightings. In practice, and as in Mexico's new regulatory regime, that link is likely  to be
provided  by independent credit rating agencies operating under a private contract with the
prospective sub-national  borrowers. The agencies will  likely produce more accurate credit
ratings,  the higher  their reputational exposure. In turn, this exposure will  be heightened  by
21the possibility  of comparing  ratings  by the same agencies  across a large number of sub-
national  clients  within, and especially,  outside  the country in question. For this reason, it
seems paramount  that, as a matter of regulation,  the ratings  required to calculate  the
capital risk weighting  of bank loans be done on global, rather than country-specific  scales.
In Mexico,  both scales are acceptable  from the regulatory stand-point  and the choice
between scales  is left to market forces (fees, signaling  needs, and the like).
The analytical  framework  presented here has three main limitations.  The model
ignores general equilibrium  effects, notably  the fact that sub-national  borrowing may  be
directed  to investment  opportunities  with national  externalities,  thus reducing  the
economic,  rather than financial,  cost of federal bail-outs. Also, the supply  function for
loans assumes  away the possible  importance  of the non-lending  business  that banks may  be
providing  to sub-national  governments (e.g., payroll  management). This is something
that may effectively  reduce the cost of lending  to a certain  customer and therefore could
limit  risk-based  interest rate differentiation  even  in the presence  of regulation. Finally,  the
elasticity  of the demand  for loans may prove endogenous  to the regulations, as states and
municipalities  priced out of the bank loan market due to risk-driven  high capital risk
weighting  requirements  are unlikely  to be able to access  bond or other financing  markets.
While those limitations  are important,  we focus on the general policy conclusions
of the paper, namely,  that the success  of Mexico's new regulatory system for sub-national
borrowing  will depend on a series of market and demand  factors but, more critically,  it
will  be determined  by the credibility  of the federal government's commitment  to renounce
bail-outs.
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